To the

Commissioner of Security

Bureau of Civil Aviation Security

A" Wing, I st - III rd  floors, Janpath Bhawan, Janpath

New Delhi 110001

India

And to whomever else it may concern, and it must concern many.

Subject: Irrationality, flaws and waste in passenger security checks at Indian airports

Dear Madams and Sirs,

With the greatest possible respect, I would like to share with you four observations on passenger security checks at Indian airports, made after multiple airplane trips within, to and from India. In summary, these are:

1.      Irrational stamping of cabin-baggage tags

2.      Ridiculous, redundant ticket and identification check at airport entrance

3.      Wasteful walkthrough metal detector

4.      Shameful and dangerous assignment of privileges for the few

I believe these observations, outlined below in a structured manner listing the context, specifying the issue, suggesting a solution and associated costs and benefits, are serious enough to merit immediate debate and action.

1.      Irrational stamping of cabin-baggage tags

Context: Airport passengers, when being subjected to security screening of their cabin-baggage, are asked to attach a tag to their articles of cabin-baggage. Cabin-baggage is then passed through a machine which presumably allows security personnel to detect undesired content. If nothing objectionable is found, then a guard stamps the tag. Later, just before passengers enter the aircraft, another guard checks that each piece of cabin-baggage carried by passengers has a tag, and that these tags are stamped.

Issue: This entire stamping and checking of tags is irrational, as the tags are easily attached and removed from a piece of cabin-baggage, without affecting the integrity of the stamp. If Bobby is the one who has managed to sneak a piece of cabin-baggage unchecked through security, he can ask his friend Rob to give him his tag (Rob can throw away his innocent bag, or put it into another bag), or steal it from any one of his thousand co-passengers who are wandering through the shops and cafes of the airport, or pick up one fallen on the floor. Not that Bobby, the scheming perpetrator in our hypothetical example, needs anyone else. He can take an almost empty bag through security, legitimately getting a stamped tag at the end of the rigmarole. Later, he places the other bag, the one containing the prohibited stuff, inside the stamped-tag-carrying-bag, and voila – he his permitted to board the aircraft.

Potential solution: Dispense with the meaningless bag tagging, stamping and checking of tags.

Implementation effort: None.

Potential gain: Savings in time. Savings of manpower. Less discomfort to passengers. A saving of paper. A reduction in waste that needs to be disposed. Cleaner airport terminals. Removing a redundant check also means increasing the focus given to the sensible checks.

2.      Ridiculous, redundant ticket and identification check at airport entrance

Context: At the entrance to airports, stands a security guard who demands of airport passengers that they produce personal identification papers, as well as some sort of printed paper which suggests they have a flight on the day, from that airport. The identification is not checked against any sort of electronic database. The “proof of flight” is often an A4 piece of paper with flight information, not standardized across airlines and travel agents, and is also not subjected to an electronic verification.

Issue: The “proof of flight” paper could be forged by a nine-year-old child with access to a less than state-of-the-art word processor, and a dot-matrix printer. Thus, checking the “proof of flight” is utterly useless. The identification check is not dazzling in its value either, as there is no electronic cross-check made with a “list of those to be apprehended”. Here, of course, we assume that the security guard, i.e. all security guards at all entrances of all airports, does not have in his head a list of all those who are to be denied air travel at Indian airports.

Potential solution: Dispense with the “identification papers” and “proof of flight” requirement at airport entrances entirely. Note that both bona fides are checked later, in any case. Note that this is the practice at many, if not all, European airports. Alternately, ask airlines for a roster of passengers, and cross check the identification papers of the passenger with this roster; furthermore, ask security agencies for a list of undesirable passengers, and cross-check identification also with this list.

Implementation effort: The first solution is free of cost. The second solution would involve massive investments in information technology systems, and would have serious privacy implications.

Potential gain: Saving of manpower, saving of time. Removing a redundant check also means increasing the focus given to the sensible checks. Less discomfort to passengers.

3.      Wasteful walkthrough metal detector

Context: Airport passengers, when being subjected to personal security screening, are asked to walk through a rectangular frame, which purportedly detects the presence of metallic objects, emitting a beep when doing so. A few seconds later, the airport passenger is asked to mount a platform where a security guard uses a hand-held metal detector on the passenger, in addition to manually frisking him or her. This second step is performed irrespective of whether the walkthrough metal detector beeped or not.

Issue: Given that the security guard checks the airport passenger with a hand-held metal-detector, and also hand-frisks him or her, the walkthrough metal detector serves absolutely no purpose.

Potential solution: One solution is to simply get rid of the walkthrough metal detectors. Another solution, one which would mirror the practice at almost every airport in Europe, would be to use a combination of the walkthrough metal detector and the manual checking, i.e. when the walkthrough metal detector goes beep, the security guard checks the passenger manually; when the walkthrough metal detector does not go beep, the security guard waves the passenger through, without touching him or her, without waving a second metal-detector at him or her. When choosing this latter option, one has to test that the walkthrough metal detectors are fit for purpose, i.e. actually do detect metal and beep loud enough – but this is an implicit requirement for all equipment at airports, including the engines of aircraft.

Implementation effort: None; except minimal effort to appropriately instruct guards to change behavior, in case the second solution is opted for.

Potential gain: Less discomfort to passengers, less chances of the government or the airport being subjected to sexual harassment suits on account of reduced physical probing of passengers, saving of time, less work for security personnel. That’s if the sensible, second option is chosen. If the first option, then we have reduced noise levels at the airport, and it is less cluttered, and massive electricity savings, over time, when one considers how many metal detectors remain switched on at airports across the world’s seventh largest country.

4.      Shameful and dangerous assignment of privileges for the few

Context: The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security lists, on publicly displayed signs at airports, no less than 22 categories of passengers who are exempted from pre-embarkation security checks. The list starts off with the President of the Republic, hits judges of the Supreme Court, and chief ministers of states et cetera. Number 20 is His Holiness, the Dalai Lama. There is only one person who is listed by name, and not as a consequence of office held. This is Number 22, Mr. Robert Vadra, son-in-law of Ms. Sonia Gandhi, daughter-in-law of a former Prime Minister of India, who, in turn, was the daughter of a former Prime Minister of India. The sign goes on to state, apparently unaware of the irony, “….except the categories specified above….all other categories….are to be subjected to pre-embarkation security checks without making any exception in any particular case”.

Issue: The 22 categories result in an undisclosed number of individuals who are entitled to refuse security checks. This is an obvious security loophole, given that one would be hard-pressed to expect security personnel to be aware of all chief ministers, governors and chief justices of 35 states and union territories, not to mention the visiting ministers of all African and South American countries. Apart from the security aspect, in no other free country would one find such a sign that sets a few above the many. This sign is yet another clear indication that India is still in chains.

Potential solution: Either change the Constitution of India which embarrassingly insists on securing to its citizens “equality of status” and “dignity of the individual”, or ask the sons-in-law and great-grandsons of prime ministers and party officials et cetera to patiently stand in a queue like the rest of us unwashed masses – whichever is the easier option, of course.

Implementation effort: Let us assume that we will leave the Constitution alone. Then, on the one hand, it merely involves putting up a sign which says, “These rules are meant to ensure our common security, and are applicable to all. Please do not embarrass us, and the billion-plus denizens of this unhappy country, by demanding an exception”. On the other hand, it is a seminal shift in thinking from a slave-society to that of free men, and might need a lot of marketing spend to raise awareness, among public servants, and among servants of the public.

Potential gain: The world’s largest democracy has one less thing to be ashamed of, and confidence in airport security increases.

Of course, it is possible that the four practices I seek to change here have ramifications and uses which I have not been able to fathom. In that case, I shall look forward to your response disputing my facts or ridiculing flaws in my logic. If, however, I am spot on, then I expect that it is your duty to act.

With democratic greetings,